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I
n the past three years, expanding 
access to antiretroviral therapy 
(ART) for HIV/AIDS has become a 
global objective and a national priority 
for many countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Large-scale treatment programs 
have been launched in countries 
spanning the continent from Lesotho 
to Ghana, paid for by domestic funds 
mobilized by African governments and 
by international donor contributions. 
While these funds, which reach into 
the billions of dollars, will pay for ART 
for many thousands of HIV-positive 
Africans, there is almost no chance that 
African countries will have the human, 
infrastructural, or ﬁ  nancial resources 
to treat everyone who is in need. 
National plans for treatment rollout 
typically call for a speciﬁ  c number of 
patients to initiate therapy within the 
ﬁ  rst one or two years of the program. 
Though the target patient numbers are 
extremely ambitious—often requiring 
a 10-fold expansion of services over a 
two-year period—they still represent 
a minority of those who are eligible 
for antiretrovirals on even the most 
conservative medical grounds. Table 1 
indicates the demand for and supply of 
ART in several African countries and 
globally, based on starting ART at a 
CD4 count of 200 cells/µl or an AIDS-
deﬁ  ning illness. 
The message of Table 1 is clear: 
rationing of ART is already occurring 
and will persist for many years to 
come. The question facing African 
governments and societies is not 
whether to ration ART, but how to 
do so in a way that maximizes social 
welfare, now and in the future. 
Inevitably, the social and economic 
consequences of rationing a scarce 
and valuable resource—treatment for 
a life-threatening illness—will vary 
widely depending on the rationing 
system chosen. In a previous article 
[1], we argued that the chances of 
achieving a socially 
desirable outcome 
from the global 
intervention now 
being launched 
will be higher if 
an open public-
policy debate 
is conducted 
and policies are 
selected that make 
transparent the 
trade-offs inherent 
in any rationing 
system. We also 
identiﬁ  ed a 
number of possible 
rationing systems 
and proposed 
several criteria 
that could be used 
to select among 
them. In this 
paper, we examine 
these issues in 
more detail and 
use an expanded 
set of criteria to 
evaluate several 
rationing systems 
that already exist in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Systems for Rationing
In economic terms, any policy or 
practice that restricts consumption 
of a good is a rationing system [2]. A 
rationing system restricts demand for 
a scarce resource so that it matches 
supply [3]. In the marketplace, price 
is the basis for rationing: those who 
can and are willing to pay the market 
price obtain the resource, while those 
who cannot or will not pay go without. 
Nonmarket goods, such as access to 
free or subsidized medical care, are 
rationed in a variety of other ways [4]. 
As used by economists, rationing is a 
morally neutral concept. It does not 
imply an intent to deprive some people 
of a good, but rather describes the 
allocation of a resource of which there 
is not enough to go around. Non-price 
rationing of health care has a long 
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history and is widespread and accepted 
in many parts of the world, reﬂ  ecting 
the widely held view that access to 
health care should be based on some 
notion of need, and not determined 
solely by ability to pay [4]. At the same 
time, non-price rationing is inherently 
political. It can be, and often is, used to 
channel resources toward or away from 
particular groups for reasons unrelated 
to their absolute or relative need for 
the resource.
In this paper, we deﬁ  ne an ART 
rationing system as any allocation of 
public resources that prioritizes access 
to HIV/AIDS treatment on the basis 
of any geographic, social, economic, 
cultural, or other nonmedical factor. 
This is important, as virtually all 
programs will set a medical threshold 
for access to treatment, in most cases 
having a CD4 count lower than 200 
cells/µl or an AIDS-deﬁ  ning illness. 
A less conservative medical eligibility 
threshold, such as that of the United 
States Department of Health and 
Human Services, which recommends 
that ART be started at a CD4 count 
of 350 cells/µl, would dramatically 
increase the number of eligible patients 
and intensify the need for rationing 
[5]. Even with the more conservative 
eligibility threshold now being applied, 
however, the ﬁ  gures in Table 1 indicate 
that demand for treatment will exceed 
supply. In the remainder of this paper, 
we will focus our attention on the 
nonmedical bases for rationing.
Explicit Rationing Systems
In many cases, governments will set 
explicit criteria for which types of 
patients should be eligible for ART 
ﬁ  rst or at lowest cost. The criteria can 
target selected subpopulations directly, 
or they can set eligibility requirements 
that intentionally give some patients 
better access than others. Possible 
subpopulations for direct targeting of 
treatment include:
Mothers of new infants. Rather 
than face an ever-increasing burden of 
orphan support, many countries are 
making ART preferentially available to 
HIV-positive mothers through testing 
and treatment at antenatal clinics. 
The “MTCT-Plus” initiative (“MTCT” 
is mother-to-child transmission, and 
“plus” refers to an essential HIV care 
package for the mother in addition to 
strategies to reduce MTCT), which has 
been implemented in many African 
countries, is the main example of this 
strategy [6]. 
Skilled workers. African countries 
face the loss of vast numbers of 
educated or trained workers, 
whose skills are vital to maintaining 
social welfare, sustaining output, 
and generating economic growth. 
Human capital can be conserved by 
giving treatment priority to nurses, 
teachers, engineers, judges, police 
ofﬁ  cers, and other skilled workers 
whose contributions are important 
to economic development or social 
stability. Botswana [7], Zambia [8], and 
Uganda [9] have recently announced 
plans to target soldiers, university 
faculty and students, and civil servants, 
respectively. 
Poor people. The social justice 
agenda pursued by some governments 
and many nongovernmental 
organizations argues that the poorest 
members of society, who are least likely 
to be able to afford private medical 
care, should have preferential access 
to publicly funded treatment programs 
[10]. Means-testing, which can be 
applied at the level of the household 
or the community and calibrated to 
achieve the desired number of patients, 
is a common way to ration social 
beneﬁ  ts [11].
High-risk populations. The extent to 
which ART can curb HIV transmission 
is a subject of current debate in the 
literature [12,13]. If treatment reduces 
the probability of transmission by 
suppressing viral load, then a public 
health argument can be made for 
giving preferential access to high-risk 
populations, such as commercial sex 
workers, truck drivers, or intravenous 
drug users. 
Governments can also intentionally 
create eligibility requirements that 
result in rationing, without specifying 
particular target populations. Rationing 
systems of this type include:
Residents of designated geographic 
areas. One obvious way to limit access 
to treatment is to offer it only to those 
The question facing 
African governments 
and societies is not 
whether to ration ART, 
but how to do so.
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Table 1. Targets for Treatment Coverage in Selected African Countries and Globally 
Country Estimated 
Number Eligible 
for Therapy, 
2004
Estimated 
Number on 
Therapy, 
December 2004a
Proportion 
Covered, 
December 
2004
Estimated 
Number Eligible 
for Therapy, 
End 2005b
Target Number 
to Be on 
Therapy, 
End 2005
Expansion
Required 
to Achieve 
Targetc
Proportion 
Covered When 
Target Is 
Reached
Botswana 75,000 37,500 50% 94,800 60,000 [41] 1.6 63.3%
Ghana 55,000 1,750 3% 74,200 30,000  [41] 17.1 40.4%
Kenya 220,000 28,500 13% 286,000 95,000 [41] 3.3 33.2%
Malawi 140,000 11,000 8% 188,600 36,000d [42] 3.3 19.1%
Mozambique     218,000 [34]        5,900 [34] 3% 290,000 20,800 [34] 3.5 7.2%
Nigeria 558,000 13,500 2% 756,000 100,000 [43] 7.4 13.2%
South Africa 837,000 49,500 6% 1,143,000 188,665 [44] 3.8 16.5%
Uganda 114,000 45,000 39% 141,000 60,000 [41] 1.3 42.6%
Zambia 149,000 20,000 13% 198,800 100,000 [45] 5.0 50.3%
Global 5,800,000 700,000 12% 7,942,000 3,000,000 [40] 4.3 37.8%
Data taken from [40] unless otherwise indicated.
aThis is the midpoint of the high and low estimates made by the World Health Organization [40]. For most countries, it appears to include estimates of patients in the public sector, nongovernmental sector, and private sector.
bCalculated as the sum of the estimated number eligible for therapy in 2004 [40] plus 6% of the adult HIV-positive population at the end of 2003 as estimated by UNAIDS [46], which is the proportion expected to become eligible over the course 
of 2005 due to normal disease progression [5].
cEnd 2005 target as multiple of number on therapy, December 2004.
dTarget for July 2005.
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Table 2. Comparison of Rationing Systems 
Rationing 
System
Effectiveness 
(Potential for 
Clinical Success)
Cost Savings 
(Relative to 
Highest Cost 
Approach)
Feasibility (Ease of 
Implementation)
Efﬁ  ciency 
(Human Capital 
Preservation)
Equity (Equitable 
Access)
Rationing 
Potential (Ability 
to Limit Demand)
Medical eligibility 
threshold (e.g., CD4 
< 200 cells/µm)
Moderate: Limits 
treatment to those 
already sick, of 
whom many will 
be too sick to save; 
does not protect 
patient against 
early opportunistic 
infections, such as 
tuberculosis. 
Moderate: Causes 
eligible patients to 
identify themselves as 
a result of symptoms, 
but maintains 
need to treat early 
opportunistic 
infections.
Moderate: Requires 
access to CD4 count 
technology, which 
many areas do not 
have.
Low: No targeting on 
human capital basis 
[47].
Moderate: All HIV+ 
individuals are equally 
eligible, but favors 
those who have 
access to laboratory 
testing, who may be 
wealthier or urban, 
and may favor those 
infected earliest, who 
may be from speciﬁ  c 
groups.
Low: Too many 
patients are eligible, 
even using the most 
conservative medical 
eligibility threshold. 
Mothers of new 
infants (MTCT-Plus)
High: Patients are 
likely to be diagnosed 
relatively early [48].
Moderate: Uses 
existing antenatal 
clinic infrastructure, 
but requires widely 
dispersed treatment 
expertise and 
capacity.
High: Already in place 
under MTCT-Plus; 
extension of existing 
antenatal clinic 
capacity.
High: Reduces societal 
burden of orphan 
care and promotes 
parental investment in 
future human capital. 
Low: Excludes all men; 
excludes women not 
of child-bearing age 
or choosing not to 
have children.
Moderate: Excludes 
more than half the 
population but retains 
eligibility for women 
of reproductive age, 
who have the highest 
HIV prevalence. 
Skilled workers High: Patients are 
in a structured 
environment and are 
likely to be diagnosed 
relatively early and to 
place a high value on 
their ability to work 
and earn income.
High: Tightly deﬁ  ned 
population; many 
employers already 
provide some medical 
facilities; may leverage 
private sector 
resources.
High: Successful 
implementation by 
many employers 
already underway.
High: Preserves 
critical skills 
needed to maintain 
development.
Low: Treats the 
elite; excludes the 
poor, unemployed, 
unskilled.
High: There are 
relatively few skilled 
workers in most 
African countries. 
Poor people Moderate: Adherence 
has been good where 
active adherence 
support has been 
provided but poor 
in less structured 
settings [49]. 
Low: Requires 
geographically 
dispersed services 
to areas with least 
existing infrastructure 
and to patients 
requiring greatest 
support.
Moderate: Some 
capacity for means 
testing is required. 
Infrastructure may 
not be adequate in 
poorest areas.
Low: Targets relatively 
economically 
unproductive 
subpopulations, 
though may also 
avoid subsidizing 
wealthier populations.
Moderate: 
Extends access to 
subpopulations that 
would not otherwise 
have it, but excludes 
middle and upper 
socioeconomic tiers.
Low: Most people in 
sub-Saharan Africa 
are poor.
High-risk
populations
Low: Patients will 
be drawn from 
marginalized or 
mobile populations 
and will be difﬁ  cult to 
support.
Low: Patients may be 
difﬁ  cult to identify 
and will require 
geographically 
dispersed services.
Moderate: Some 
populations will be 
relatively easy to 
reach but others 
will be outside the 
existing health care 
system.
Moderate: Has the 
potential to protect 
economically active 
populations, such 
as truck drivers or 
miners.
Moderate: 
Extends access to 
subpopulations that 
would not otherwise 
have it, but excludes 
those who lead low-
risk lives.
High: The high-risk 
population tends to 
be relatively small.
Residents of 
designated 
geographic areas
Moderate: Ensures 
patient proximity to 
services, but patients 
may interrupt or 
stop treatment when 
they must leave the 
catchment area.
High: Minimizes total 
infrastructure costs.
Moderate: Easy 
to establish, but 
difﬁ  cult to prevent 
excluded patients 
from migrating into 
catchment areas.
Moderate: Could 
be targeted to 
economically 
important areas, 
but no individual 
targeting within 
catchment areas.
Moderate: Equal 
access for everyone in 
catchment areas, but 
excludes everyone 
outside catchment 
areas.
High: Can designate 
catchment areas to 
encompass only the 
number of eligible 
patients for which 
treatment “slots” are 
available.
Ability to co-pay Moderate: Co-
payment may increase 
motivation to adhere, 
but many patients will 
stop treatment when 
their own funds run 
short.
Moderate: Cost 
to public sector is 
reduced, but cost to 
patients is higher.
High: Easy to 
implement and 
already underway in 
many places.
High: Reaches 
employed persons; 
conserves public 
resources to allow 
more patients to be 
treated.
Low: Excludes those 
too poor to pay.
High: Relatively few 
people can afford 
even a modest co-
payment.
Commitment to 
adherence
High: Limits treatment 
to those most likely to 
adhere or who have 
demonstrated high 
adherence.
High: Some costs for 
adherence support, 
but most strategies 
are inexpensive and 
may reduce need for 
expensive second-line 
or salvage therapy.
Moderate: Requires 
that adherence 
support be widely 
available.
Moderate: No 
targeting on human 
capital basis, but 
could exclude those 
who are personally 
irresponsible. 
High: Equal access to 
all potential patients.
Low: Up to 100% of 
medically eligible 
patients could qualify.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1101
who reside in speciﬁ  ed geographic 
catchment areas [14]. These areas 
can be distributed around the 
country, centered in regions of high 
HIV prevalence, or concentrated in 
urban centers or politically important 
regions. Excluding patients who do 
not live within the designated areas 
may not be feasible, but most patients 
will not be able to afford the cost 
of regular transport or permanent 
relocation. 
Ability to co-pay. If patients are 
required to contribute even a small 
share of the cost of treatment, the 
number who can access therapy is likely 
to fall dramatically. Governments could 
in principle match supply and demand 
by setting and adjusting the level of 
co-payment required. The obvious 
outcome is a rationing system that 
favors the upper socioeconomic tiers of 
patients, who likely include the majority 
of skilled workers. In some societies 
men will also have preferential access 
when a cash payment is required [15]. 
A drawback of requiring co-payment is 
that poorer patients may stop therapy 
because they run out of funds. This is 
the reason for stopping cited by nearly 
half of all non-adherent patients in a 
recent study in Botswana [16].
Commitment to adherence to 
therapy. Adherence to treatment 
regimens has been found to be the 
most important determinant of the 
success of ART at the individual 
patient level [17]. One way to 
improve the success of a large-scale 
treatment program, while at the 
same time limiting access, could 
therefore be to restrict therapy to 
patients who are judged to have the 
ability and willingness to adhere or 
who demonstrate high adherence 
after initiating therapy. Results of 
pilot projects suggest that requiring 
attendance at pre-treatment counseling 
sessions helps to screen for adherence 
commitment, for example [18].
Implicit Rationing Systems
The alternative to specifying explicitly 
who will have priority access to resources 
is to allow implicit rationing systems to 
arise. These can be thought of as the 
default conditions that will prevail in the 
absence of explicit choices.
Access to HIV testing. Voluntary 
counseling and HIV testing (VCT) 
is typically the entry point into an 
HIV/AIDS treatment program. If 
some subpopulations, such as youth 
or particular occupational groups, are 
targeted for HIV education and VCT 
services or promotion campaigns, they 
will have an advantage over others in 
seeking treatment, as will those who 
simply live closer to VCT facilities [19].
Patient costs. Most countries will 
scale up their treatment programs 
incrementally, at ﬁ  rst offering services 
at only a few facilities before gradually 
adding more. Ghana started with four 
public treatment sites in 2004, for 
example, but is aiming to have 16 in 
operation by the end of 2006 [20]. For 
most patients, bus or taxi fare will be 
required for regular trips to the clinic, 
and each trip will take up a good deal 
of time. Previous research has found 
that indirect costs due to travel time 
and transport play an important role 
in limiting access to medical care 
[21–24]. Unless transport is subsidized, 
limiting the number of service sites 
will effectively ration treatment to 
those who live nearby and to better-off 
households that have the resources to 
travel.
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Table 2. Continued
Rationing 
System
Effectiveness 
(Potential for 
Clinical Success)
Cost Savings 
(Relative to 
Highest Cost 
Approach)
Feasibility (Ease of 
Implementation)
Efﬁ  ciency 
(Human Capital 
Preservation)
Equity (Equitable 
Access)
Rationing 
Potential (Ability 
to Limit Demand)
Access to testing Moderate: Could favor 
patients who actively 
seek testing and are 
thus more motivated.
Moderate: Requires no 
additional action to 
identify patients.
High: Some early 
successes with VCT 
campaigns suggest 
feasibility.
Moderate: Favors 
target populations for 
VCT campaigns, who 
may or may not be 
efﬁ  cient populations 
to treat.
Moderate: Favors 
some but does not 
exclude others.
Moderate: Patient 
numbers could be 
reduced by limiting 
access to VCT, but 
VCT is also an 
important prevention 
strategy and is being 
expanded rapidly.
Patient costs Moderate: Ensures 
patient proximity to 
services, but distant 
patients may stop 
treatment when they 
can no longer afford 
transport.
High: Minimizes 
infrastructure needs 
and requires no 
additional action to 
identify patients.
High: Default; requires 
little action.
Moderate: Favors 
those who can afford 
costs, who may be 
income earners, but 
also favors those who 
happen to live closest 
to facilities.
Low: Excludes those 
too poor to pay for 
transport or who live 
in remote areas.
Moderate: If patient 
costs are high, few 
people will be able 
to afford treatment, 
but numbers will be 
difﬁ  cult to control or 
predict.
First come, ﬁ  rst 
served
Moderate: No effort to 
prioritize patients but 
could encourage early 
diagnosis.
High: Requires no 
additional action to 
identify patients.
High: Default; requires 
little action.
Low: No targeting on 
human capital basis; 
could favor those who 
were infected ﬁ  rst and 
are at greatest risk.
Moderate: Everyone 
has access, but system 
is highly susceptible 
to queue-jumping.
High: Door can 
be closed once all 
treatment “slots” are 
ﬁ  lled.
Queuing  Moderate: No effort 
to prioritize patients; 
very sick patients 
could be stuck in 
queue.
High: Requires no 
additional action to 
identify patients.
High: Default; requires 
little action.
Low: Favors patients 
with low opportunity 
cost of time (e.g., the 
unemployed) and 
wastes time of those 
who participate.
Moderate: Everyone 
has access, but system 
is highly susceptible 
to queue-jumping.
High: Queue can 
be closed once all 
treatment “slots” are 
ﬁ  lled.
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First come, ﬁ  rst served. In the 
absence of any other requirements, 
most facilities are likely to treat everyone 
who is medically eligible, until the 
supply of drugs, diagnostics, or expertise 
runs out. Patients who arrive after that 
happens may be put on a waiting list, 
sent to another facility, or simply sent 
away. This approach, which reﬂ  ects an 
absolute shortage of treatment “slots,” is 
likely to favor three groups of patients: 
those who are already paying privately 
for antiretroviral drugs and shift over 
to publicly funded treatment once it 
is available; those who develop AIDS-
related symptoms ﬁ  rst, in most cases 
because they were infected earliest; and 
the few HIV-positive individuals who do 
not yet have AIDS but have taken the 
initiative to go for a test and know their 
own status.
Queuing. One of the most common 
ways to ration scarce resources is 
the time-honored, time-consuming 
tradition of queuing. While it is 
possible to create a waiting list that 
keeps track of individuals’ places in 
line, in many African countries the 
queue is a literal line outside the 
clinic door. Such queuing will favor 
patients whose opportunity cost of time 
is low [23]. This group is likely to be 
dominated by unemployed men and 
by women who can bring their small 
children with them. It may penalize 
employed persons and farming 
households that face a high seasonal 
demand for labor.
No matter what system is used, 
informal and/or illicit arrangements 
can often be made that give 
preferential access to treatment to 
those with social, economic, or political 
inﬂ  uence. In all of the implicit systems, 
and in some of the explicit ones, 
there will very often be a high degree 
of queue jumping. Elites capture a 
disproportionate share of resources in 
all countries; in developing countries, 
where enforcement of rules tends to 
be weak and informal arrangements 
common, it is safe to assume that 
members of the elite who are medically 
eligible for therapy will ﬁ  nd a way to 
get it. De facto rationing on the basis 
of social or economic position will thus 
occur. It is the phenomenon of queue 
jumping that turns what appear to 
be equitable, if inefﬁ  cient, rationing 
systems, such as ﬁ  rst-come, ﬁ  rst-served, 
into an inequitable and inefﬁ  cient 
approach.
Many other potential criteria for 
rationing ART have been proposed or 
are in use [11,14,25,26]. Treatment 
access could be targeted, for example, 
to young people (because they 
respond best to the therapy and have 
their most productive years ahead of 
them); families of current patients (to 
promote adherence); those with debts 
(so that the loan default rate does not 
increase); patients with tuberculosis (to 
suppress transmission of tuberculosis); 
or children (who are least able to 
protect themselves).
Evaluating the Systems 
The different approaches to rationing 
ART described above will inevitably 
have very different social and economic 
consequences for African populations. 
In this section, we assess the rationing 
systems’ probable outcomes using 
criteria that capture most of the 
principles that governments use to 
evaluate policies and social investments. 
They are by no means the sole criteria 
of interest, nor should they necessarily 
be given equal weight. We propose 
them only as a starting point for 
thinking about the consequences of 
alternative approaches. 
Effectiveness. Does the rationing 
system produce a high rate of 
successfully treated patients? 
“Successful treatment” could be 
deﬁ  ned as a fully suppressed viral 
load or high CD4 count over a 
sustained period of time. It might also 
incorporate some measure of viral 
resistance to the drugs. We assume that 
early diagnosis and high adherence 
improve effectiveness and that patient 
motivation improves adherence, but 
level of education and socioeconomic 
status do not [27]. 
Cost savings. Is the cost per patient 
treated low, compared to other 
approaches? Cost is characterized 
in this way to maintain internal 
consistency: a rating of “high” in 
this domain is desirable, as it is for 
all other criteria. Cost is deﬁ  ned 
broadly, to incorporate costs incurred 
by patients, providers, insurers, and 
the public health system, including 
the identiﬁ  cation of medically 
eligible patients and management of 
opportunistic infections, side effects, 
and treatment failure. 
Feasibility. Are the human and 
infrastructural resources needed for 
implementation available? We deﬁ  ne 
an approach as feasible if there are no 
obstacles to carrying it out that appear 
to be insurmountable under typical 
conditions in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Economic efﬁ  ciency. To what extent 
does the system mitigate the long-
term impacts of the HIV epidemic 
on economic development? AIDS 
has the potential to affect economic 
development in many ways [28]. We 
focus on human capital accumulation, 
where human capital is deﬁ  ned as the 
accumulated skill, knowledge, and 
expertise of workers [29].
Social equity. Do all medically 
eligible patients, including those from 
poor or disadvantaged subpopulations, 
have equal access to treatment? We 
deﬁ  ne “equity” as equitable access 
for all at the current time, not 
redistribution of resources to redress 
past injustices, and we assume that a 
system’s susceptibility to queue-jumping 
reduces its equity.
Rationing potential. Will the chosen 
system sufﬁ  ciently reduce the number 
of patients? The purpose of any 
rationing system is to match demand to 
the available supply.
Impact on HIV transmission. To 
what extent does treatment reduce 
HIV incidence? Preferentially treating 
those who are likely to transmit the 
virus could reduce HIV incidence more 
than treating those who are not likely 
transmitters [13,30].
Sustainability. Can the system be 
sustained over time? This criterion 
pertains to the durability of the 
source of funding. We assume that 
donor support will hold out for some 
time but will ultimately ebb, leaving 
national governments responsible 
for an increasing share of the costs of 
treatment [31]. 
Effect on the health care system. 
How does the system for allocating 
ART affect the country’s health care 
system as a whole? The choice of 
rationing strategies could inﬂ  uence 
whether expanding treatment access 
will strengthen general health services 
for poor communities or drain 
resources from non-HIV health care 
to meet the demand for ART, further 
crippling general health services. 
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To demonstrate how one might 
evaluate alternative rationing 
strategies, Table 2 uses the ﬁ  rst six 
of these criteria to compare each 
of the rationing systems described 
above. The table omits the impact 
on HIV transmission and the impact 
on resistance, because there is little 
agreement on how the treatment 
of different populations is likely 
to affect these outcomes. It also 
omits the two long-term “systems” 
criteria—sustainability and effect on 
the health care system—because most 
treatment programs are so new that 
even informed speculation is difﬁ  cult 
to offer.
There are several limitations to 
the analysis presented in Table 2. 
First, we do not “know” the outcomes 
of the strategies described above, 
because most of them have either not 
yet been tried or, if tried, have not 
been evaluated. Prior experience in 
delivering health care in sub-Saharan 
Africa suggests that some of our 
assumptions and ratings are correct. 
We are conﬁ  dent, for example, that 
an implicit rationing system based on 
queuing will result in queue-jumping, 
and therefore be inequitable. We 
are also conﬁ  dent that targeting 
skilled workers will improve labor 
productivity and therefore promote 
economic efﬁ  ciency. Our ratings of 
some of the other systems, in contrast, 
are largely speculative. Table 2 also 
cannot capture the possibility that 
outcomes will vary by country, setting, 
or context. 
A second limitation involves the 
criteria we selected for evaluation. 
We applied six criteria that we believe 
capture the key considerations in 
designing an HIV/AIDS treatment 
program, and we identiﬁ  ed but did 
not apply three others that could alter 
the overall outcomes. Undoubtedly, 
there are other criteria that also 
matter. We also could not account 
for potential interactions among the 
criteria. Cost and feasibility are clearly 
related, for example; at some level of 
cost, any system could be considered 
feasible. Many would argue that 
social equity is essential to sustainable 
economic development, and that 
efﬁ  ciency and equity cannot therefore 
be separated. While we recognize that 
these relationships exist, neither data 
nor experience allows us to address 
them here. 
Conclusions
During the initial months of existing 
ART programs in sub-Saharan Africa, 
limited access to health care services 
and widespread reluctance to be 
tested for HIV or enroll in treatment 
programs have greatly limited patient 
numbers [32,33]. This phenomenon, 
for as long as it persists, may prevent 
demand from exceeding supply, and 
no rationing will be necessary. There 
are already some situations, however, 
in which patients demanding access 
to care have overwhelmed available 
resources [34]. Even under the most 
optimistic scenarios for reaching 
universal coverage, there will be a 
period of at least several years when 
treatment is scarce.
Rationing of medical care is not 
a new phenomenon, nor is it by any 
means limited to developing countries. 
Waiting lists, whether for speciﬁ  c 
procedures, organs for transplant, or 
experimental treatments, are common 
in North America and Europe. Many 
state governments in the US are 
explicitly limiting access to more 
expensive AIDS drugs [35]. The HIV/
AIDS crisis in Africa is simply bringing 
the need for rationing into stark relief.
There is no single rationing system, 
or combination of systems, that will 
be optimal for all countries at all 
times. Table 2 highlights the trade-off 
between economic efﬁ  ciency and social 
equity: rationing systems that rate high 
in terms of efﬁ  ciency generally rate 
low in terms of equity. African societies 
will place different weights on the 
values inherent in goals such as equity 
and efﬁ  ciency, and decisions about 
rationing will be made at multiple levels 
of the health care system. International 
funding agencies have already begun 
to express their priorities through the 
amounts and conditions of their grants. 
Ministries of health will set policies 
that reﬂ  ect national priorities, followed 
by district and local departments of 
health. Even individual health care 
workers, such as nurses at clinics where 
antiretroviral drugs are available but 
scarce, will be forced to ration access to 
patients who meet the clinic’s or their 
own criteria [36].
Because access to antiretroviral drugs 
is a matter of life or death for patients 
with AIDS, the choice of rationing 
systems matters deeply. African 
governments can take one of two 
courses: ration deliberately, on the basis 
of explicit criteria, or allow implicit 
rationing to prevail. Implicit rationing 
is not likely to maximize social welfare, 
nor does it allow for transparency 
and accountability in policy making. 
We believe that the magnitude of the 
intervention now underway and the 
importance of the resource allocation 
decisions to be made call for public 
participation, policy analysis, and 
political debate in the countries 
affected. Several proposals have been 
made for how such processes could 
be carried out ([11,26,38,39]; A. 
Acharya, unpublished data). In the 
absence of such processes, decisions 
about access to treatment will be made 
arbitrarily and will, most likely, result 
in inequity and inefﬁ  ciency—the 
worst of both worlds. Governments 
that make deliberate choices, in 
contrast, are more likely to achieve a 
socially desirable return from the large 
investments now being made than are 
those that allow queuing and queue-
jumping to dominate. Countries that 
promote an open policy debate have 
the opportunity to ration ART in a 
manner that sustains both economic 
development and social cohesion—in 
the age of AIDS, the best of both 
worlds.  
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